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Engels, in his preface to Capital, Volume 3, as part of his
running commentary on &dquo;determinist&dquo; Marxists, warned that the
reader should not expect to find &dquo;fixed, cut-to-measure, once
and for all applicable definitions in Marx’s works&dquo;:
It is self-evident that where things and their interrelations are
conceived, not as fixed, but as changing, their mental images, the
ideas, are likewise subject to change and transformation, and they
are not encapsulated in rigid definitions, but are developed in
their historical or logical process of formation. [Marx, 1967b:
13-14]
According to Engels, then, Marx’s terms are meant to express
a conception of things and their interrelations-&dquo;not as fixed, but
as changing&dquo;-and, consequently, the definitions of these terms
must also change. This usage of terms led Pareto to comment that
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Marx’s words are like bats: one can see in them both birds and
mice (Ollman, 1971: 3).
Accordingly, when Marx laid out his materialist conception
of history in his &dquo;Preface&dquo; to A Contribution to the Critique of
Political Economy, he stated that the &dquo;mode of production&dquo;
determines &dquo;the general process of social, political and intel-
lectual life&dquo; (Marx, 1971: 20-21). Yet, on the very same page, the
same &dquo;determining&dquo; role is attributed to &dquo;relations of pro-
duction,&dquo; &dquo;economic conditions of production,&dquo; &dquo;productive
forces,&dquo; &dquo;the economic foundation,&dquo; the &dquo;social forces of
production,&dquo; and the &dquo;social conditions of existence.&dquo; These
terms not only refer to different things-in the case of &dquo;social
conditions of existence&dquo; this is quite clear-but, more important,
some of them seem to include in their meaning the parts of society
that Marx says they &dquo;determine&dquo; (Ollman, 1971: 6-7). Property
relations, as a system of legal claims, for example, come under
the heading of &dquo;superstructure,&dquo; but they are also an integral part
of the &dquo;relations of production,&dquo; which are part of the &dquo;economic
base&dquo; and which in turn &dquo;determine&dquo; the superstructure (Ollman,
1971: 6-7). The same is true for our previous example of the
system of credit and national debt in Great Britain’s early
industrialization. When viewed from one perspective, credit
and taxation are merely a set of laws within the legal and political
superstructure. Yet how can a system of credit and taxation be
clearly separated from the economic base? Does it not clearly
include also, within its very definition, the actual workings of
an economic system? . 
’
Until we examine the ways in which Marx conceived of these
definitions and categories, his usage of definitions seems at best
inconsistent, if not altogether haphazard. For Marx, concepts
like &dquo;superstructure,&dquo; &dquo;economic base,&dquo; and &dquo;relations of
production&dquo; could not be clearly distinguished and separated
from one another because they do not exist, in reality, as separate
entities. These concepts describe, for Marx, certain aspects of a
densely interrelated, dynamic structure, sometimes likened to an
&dquo;organic whole&dquo; of society. The interaction between these
different aspects of society can be more properly referred to as
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inneraction (OIlman, 1971: 17). Marx, after all, claims that it is
the &dquo;inner connections&dquo; of society that he is studying, not the
interaction between separate factors or &dquo;independent variables&dquo;
in society (Marx, 1967a: 19). Indeed, &dquo;mutual&dquo; or &dquo;reciprocal
interaction&dquo; between elements presupposes, according to Engels,
the existence of an &dquo;organic&dquo; whole.2 This &dquo;organic&dquo; conception
allows Marx to treat his entire subject-matter as &dquo;different ..
aspects of one unit&dquo; (Ollman, 1971:. 17).
This &dquo;organic&dquo; conception is fundamentally different from the
commonplace conception of superstructure and base as separate
factors, between which a thinker chooses in line with his &dquo;deter-
ministic&dquo; or &dquo;voluntaristic&dquo; tendencies. Different aspects of the
social whole-like superstructure and economic base-are
distinguished by Marx not because they are in reality separate
&dquo;factors,&dquo; but because they help to explain the social processes
within the structured, &dquo;organic&dquo; whole: &dquo;these categories
therefore express the forms of being, the characteristics of
existence, and often only individual sides of this specific society,
this subject&dquo; (Marx, 1973: 106). Further, these &dquo;political eco-
nomic categories&dquo; are only &dquo;abstract expressions of the real,
transitory, historic social relations,&dquo; and &dquo;only remain true
while these relations exist&dquo; (Marx and Engels, 1955: 34). Far
from being strictly defined, mutually exclusive, and separate
social factors, as they are almost universally treated in the China
field, superstructure and economic base are acts of conceptualiza-
tion that refer to different aspects of the social whole that Marx
wishes to highlight for purposes of analysis. They contain, as
Ollman so convincingly demonstrates, a &dquo;cluster&dquo; of qualities and
social relations, all of which are so closely related that they, at
times, overlap. This is true for all of Marx’s concepts. The concept
of &dquo;capital,&dquo; for example, includes in its very meaning the social
relations between capital and labor-the entire social significance
of capitalism as a process of production in all its superstructural
and material aspects (Ollman, 1971: 11-12). Capital, in &dquo;The
Communist Manifesto,&dquo; is described as &dquo;that kind of property
which exploits wage-labour, and which cannot increase except
upon condition of begetting a new supply of wage-labour for
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fresh exploitation&dquo; (Marx and Engels, 1968: 47). This description
necessarily entails a specific superstructure-a set of property
laws sanctioning the private ownership of capital in the form of
. 
means of production, as well as laws enabling workers to sell
their labor as free individuals on the marketplace. This descrip-
tion also necessarily entails a specific set of attitudes or &dquo;con-
sciousness&dquo; on the part of workers. In order to willingly sell
their labor-time or, in Marx’s terms, in order to be exploited for
their surplus labor for any period of time, an overwhelming
proportion of the laboring population has to feel that in some
sense this arrangement is right and proper, and that there is
indeed no other way to go about production.
Capital, like all of Marx’s terms, is a many-faceted concept
that contains private property, a distinctive system of law, wage
labor, the worker, the worker’s product, commodities, means
of production, the capitalist, money, and value and presupposes
certain aspects of human consciousness (Ollman, 1971: 12).
Elements of both superstructure and base combine to form the
concept of capital which, for Marx, was of great help in describ-
ing an ongoing social process. This usage of concepts in no way
separates superstructure from economic base, as they clearly
must be separated in the common dualistic conception where
superstructure and base are contrasted as counterparts of the
poles of, respectively, voluntarism and determinism.
As he sought to understand society, Marx sometimes felt it
necessary to create new concepts with which to analyze the social
processes of capitalism. This is merely a matter of mentally
dividing up the social whole in a distinct manner for a particular
analytical purpose. &dquo;The result is a new social factor, a new unit
in which to think about and refer to society&dquo; (Ollman, 1971: 20).
The key social category created in this way is the &dquo;relations of
production,&dquo; the core of which lies &dquo;in the complex interaction
of production, distribution, exchange and consumption&dquo;
(Ollman, 1971: 20). Yet Marx assigns &dquo;relations of production&dquo; to
the economic base of society and conceives of them as vitally
important, because out of this entity the whole superstructure
arises and because the relations of production comprise human
material life, where workers interact with &dquo;nature,&dquo; forming their
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own consciousness (Marx, 1970: 86-88; 1971: 20-21). The preva-
lent conception of superstructure and base as separate factors,
indeed as opposite poles of a determinist/voluntarist spectrum,
appears here as a positive barrier to understanding either Marx
or Mao. For although these relations of production are con-
sidered as part of the economic base, they incorporate not only
the technical and economic aspects of production-for new types
of technology transform the work process and are used to
displace workers-but also the legal aspects of the superstructure,
including ownership rights to the means of production, existing
wage scales, and power and authority relations within the factory.
Here superstructure and base interact so closely that they are
scarcely distinguishable. A realization of this basic Marxian
method of analysis is absolutely vital to any effort to assess
Mao as a Marxist thinker.
CA USA 7TON AND DETERMINATION
IN DIALECTICAL ANAL YSIS
But if Marx’s terms include such closely interrelated aspects
that are, in many respects, indistinguishable, what did he mean
when he suggested that the base &dquo;determines&dquo; the superstructure?
Does not &dquo;determine,&dquo; in the determinist interpretations of Marx,
clearly imply a causal interaction between two mutually exclusive
social factors? Did not Marx clearly say, in his &dquo;Preface&dquo; to A
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, as analysts of
Mao so often point out (Meisner, 1971) that &dquo;The mode of
production of material life conditions the general process of
social, political, and intellectual life,&dquo; and that &dquo;It is not
the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but
their existence that determines their consciousness&dquo;? .
&dquo;Determine,&dquo; in nondialectical analysis envisaging separate
&dquo;independent variables,&dquo; normally entails a causal interaction
between separate social factors, but in Marx’s dialectical method
it means something quite different. When Marx, for example,
writes about production, distribution, exchange, and con-
sumption, he asserts, characteristically, that they are &dquo;links of
a single whole, different aspects of one unit&dquo; (Marx, 1971: 204).
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But when he continues, sketching out the causal relations between
these aspects, he seems to contradict himself. First he writes that
production &dquo;determines&dquo; all the others and is &dquo;decisive,&dquo; then he
asserts that those aspects &dquo;determined&dquo; by production in turn
determine it:
Production is the decisive phase, both. with regard to the contra-
dictory aspects of production and with regard to other phases. A
distinct mode of production thus determines the specific mode of
consumption, distribution, exchange and the specific relations
of these dif, ferent phases to one another. Production in the narrow
sense, however, is in its turn also determined by the other aspects.
For example, if the market, or the sphere of exchange, expands,
. then the volume of production grows and tends to become more
differentiated. Production also changes in consequence of changes
in distribution of the population in town and countryside, and the
like. Production is, finally, determined by the demands of con-
sumption. There is an interaction between the various aspects.
Such interaction takes place in any organic entity. [Marx,
1971: 204-205] 
’
This contradiction is only apparent. Remember that Marx talks
about exchange, consumption, and distribution as being, along
with production, merely aspects of a single structural unit. In this
sense production determines the others because the others are all
&dquo;links of a single whole,&dquo; called, in this perspective, &dquo;mode of
production.&dquo; The distinct &dquo;mode of production&dquo; Marx is referring
to is not &dquo;determining&dquo; in the sense of &dquo;cause&dquo;-it is &dquo;deter-
mining&dquo; in the sense ofpresuppose, for a certain type of exchange,
consumption, and distribution are included within the concept of
&dquo;mode of production.&dquo;
Marx spells this point out more clearly in his Capital, a work
subsequent to A Contribution to the Critique of Political
Economy. At one point he explained that the capitalist mode of
production &dquo;presupposes&dquo; capital, commodity production,
landed property, and wage labor (Marx, 1967b: 820-826). In
other words, the process of production as a whole is viewed as a
&dquo;unity of the direct production process and the circulation
process&dquo; which under capitalism &dquo;presupposes&dquo; specific forms
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of exchange, consumption, distribution, and property (Marx, _.
1967b: 828). In a related sense, Marx explained that the concept
of capital &dquo;presupposes&dquo; a specific distribution of property-
the expropriation of the landed rural laborer, concentration
of means of production into the hands of a minority, and exclu-
sive ownership of land by another minority. All of these social-
economic relations, Marx says, &dquo;determine&dquo; the &dquo;entire
character and movement of production&dquo; (Marx, 1967b: 879). In
all of these senses, by the word &dquo;determine&dquo; Marx clearly means
that given a certain mode of production, you must necessarily
also find a certain form of exchange, consumption, property,
and social relations connected with it.
Marx makes manifestly clear in the cited paragraph that
&dquo;determine&dquo; does not mean &dquo;cause&dquo; when he shifts his per-
spective by inserting &dquo;in the narrow sense&dquo; after &dquo;production.&dquo;
After this point he is talking about production not in the sense
of the whole social process or &dquo;mode&dquo; of production, but in the
narrow sense of the specific act of manufacturing the commodi-
ties that are to be distributed, exchanged, and consumed. When
Marx shifts his perspective in this manner, production no longer
&dquo;determines&dquo; the other aspects, but it is reciprocally interre-
lated with them-it is &dquo;in turn also determined by the other
aspects.&dquo; Such dynamic, reciprocal inneraction between the
different aspects is the process that generates change in any
structured whole.
Similarly, when Marx asserts that &dquo;the mode of production
of material life conditions the general process of social, political
and intellectual life,&dquo; he does not mean, as asserted in deter-
minist interpretations, that the production process, in the
narrow sense, &dquo;determines&dquo; (in the sense of &dquo;cause&dquo;) social,
political, and intellectual life. Indeed, all of these social,
political, and intellectual aspects are included within and
presupposed by the concept &dquo;mode of production&dquo; (Harvey,
1973: 197-206). This is Marx’s way of asserting that the process
of production (in the narrow sense) and human social and
intellectual life are so densely interrelated that they are parts
of a single structural whole. When subsequently he asserts that
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&dquo;It is not the consciousness of men that determines their
existence, but their existence that determines their conscious-
ness,&dquo; he is merely stressing, in opposition to &dquo;idealist&dquo; philoso-
phers, that the dialectic of social change is firmly rooted in
human material life. The economic base no more causally deter-
mines human consciousness than human consciousness causally
determines the economic base. Instead, a dense structure exists,
with a change in any one of the aspects of the structure necessi-
tating a shift in the relations of all the aspects and perhaps even
changing the nature of the structure as a whole (Harvey, 1974;
Ollman, 1973). An insensitivity to the difficulties inherent in
Marx’s use of concepts and definitions leads to an interpreta-
tion of Marx that sees causation between separate social factors
if, perhaps, with some secondary, vestigal reaction-rather than
mutual &dquo;inneraction&dquo; between the densely interrelated aspects
of a single conceptual structure. This first interpretation
accounts for the &dquo;economic determinism of orthodox Marxism&dquo;
that is so often unjustifiably used as a yardstick with which to
measure the first aspect of Mao’s voluntarism.
CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF
THE SECOND ASPECT OF MAO’S &dquo;VOLUNTARISM-
If Marx was clearly no determinist in the sense attributed to
him by interpreters of Mao-in other words, if the economic
base is no separate, &dquo;objective&dquo; force which &dquo;predetermines&dquo;
history, but is instead closely interrelated with and modified by
the various aspects of the superstructure, which together form a
mode of production and develop in distinctive histories in
different geographical areas-then it stands to reason that Marx
could never have logically asserted a world-theory of &dquo;stages&dquo; of
history or even a theory of the &dquo;timing&dquo; of revolution which
would be applicable across the board to all times and places.
Yet this is precisely the type of theory commonly attributed to
Marx and used as the standard to measure Mao’s voluntarism
in the second sense of the word. Mao is said to exhibit an
&dquo;impatience&dquo; with these &dquo;objectively determined&dquo; stages that is
even more &dquo;extreme&dquo; than Lenin’s (Schram, 1969: 266). He went
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so far as to rely heavily upon an aroused peasantry instead of
waiting for the further development of capitalism and then
relying upon the working class, as Marx is alleged to have laid
down as a general revolutionary proposition applicable to all
times and places (Meisner, 1967: 267). For Schram, nothing is
more indicative of Mao’s &dquo;extreme voluntarism&dquo; than his idea
of &dquo;telescoping&dquo; the stages of revolution, and his declarations
that &dquo;sprouts&dquo; of communism are developing at present within
Chinese society. To Schram’s mind, this is a total abrogation
of Marx’s conception of distinct and &dquo;objectively determined&dquo;
stages-a voluntaristic abrogation which he finds to be barely
distinguishable from Trotsky’s own allegedly &dquo;total&dquo; denial of
distinctions between stages within a revolution (Schram, 1971:
230-231 )..
The ultimate source for a supposed theory of stages in Marx is
his &dquo;materialist conception of history,&dquo; which he laid down in
outline form in his &dquo;Preface&dquo; to A Contribution to the Critique
of Political Economy. This same short piece serves also as the
source for determinist misinterpretations of Marx, based upon a
misreading that attributes a causal function to productive forces,
rather than a set of dense interrelations between productive
forces, relations of production, and superstructure-all of which
constitute, for Marx, a &dquo;mode of production.&dquo; But when Marx
says in this &dquo;Preface&dquo; that &dquo;The mode of production of material
life conditions the general process of social, political and
intellectual life,&dquo; he is commonly taken to mean that the
&dquo;economic base,&dquo; a separate factor from social, political, and
intellectual life, causes all these other aspects of society, which
are all drawn along in its inevitable, &dquo;predetermined&dquo; movement
(Meisner, 1971: 6-7; Schram and d’Encausse, 1969: 17). With the
forces of production thus mistakenly given an almost mystical
life of their own, the implications of the sentences immediately
following the &dquo;Preface&dquo; provide the raw material for reading
into Marx a rigid, a priori conception of stages of history:
At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces
of society come into conflict with the existing relations of
production or-this merely expresses the same thing in legal
terms-within the property relations within the framework of
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which they have operated hitherto. From forms of development
of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters.
Then begins an era of social revolution... , No social order is
ever destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is
sufficient have been developed, and new superior relations of
production never replace older ones before the material condi-
tions for their existence have matured within the framework of
the old society. Mankind thus inevitably sets itself only such
tasks as it is able to solve, since closer examination will always
show that the problem itself arises only when the material condi-
tions for its solution are already present or at least in the course
of formation. In broad outline, the Asiatic, ancient, feudal and
modern bourgeois modes of production may be designated as
epochs marking progress in the economic development of
society. [Marx, 1971: 21] .
From a determinist perspective, this passage has two broad
implications. First, Marx appears to be saying that a political
revolution will only come about when existing relations of
production &dquo;fetter&dquo; the development of productive forces. In
other words, a socialist revolution will not be possible until
all the productive forces for which capitalism is &dquo;sufficient&dquo; have
been developed. And, as the four different modes of production
are listed as &dquo;epochs marking progress in the economic develop-
ment of society,&dquo; Marx seems to be saying that capitalism
is a necessary and inevitable stage between feudal and/ or Asiatic
and socialist modes of production. Second, upon this determin-
ist reading, Marx seems to imply in this passage that these stages
of history are distinct and separate, punctuated by the great
political revolutions that mark their passing. In other words,
feudal relations of production are not and cannot be trans-
formed until after the bourgeois revolution, and capitalist
relations of production will not be transformed until after the
proletarian revolution, and so forth. As Schram asserts, the
&dquo;class nature of a given historical phase and the actual role of the
various classes during this phase&dquo; must be closely associated
in the determinist Marx. So, quite naturally, the &dquo;bourgeois-
democratic revolution which constituted the transition from
feudalism to capitalism would likewise be carried out by the
bourgeoisie&dquo; (Schram and d’Encausse, 1969: 19). From this
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determinist perspective, Mao, who advocated revolution before
capitalism had &dquo;fully&dquo; developed in China, who relied on the
peasantry to carry out this &dquo;premature&dquo; revolution, and who
subsequently blurred the distinction between historical stages
by encouraging the development of &dquo;sprouts&dquo; of future modes of
production within the present society, exhibits an &dquo;impatience&dquo;
with &dquo;objectively determined&dquo; stages of history characteristic
of an extreme voluntarist.
DETERMINISM AND STAGES OF HISTORY
Of these two aspects of the determinist concepts of stages, the
second-that of the necessity of distinct, separate stages-is most
clearly without firm basis in Marx’s writings. Closer examination
of Marx’s histories clarifies this point. Marx’s historical
treatment in Capital of Great Britain’s transition from feu- 
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dalism to capitalism makes clear that the &dquo;revolution&dquo; marking
the boundary between feudalism and capitalism was not
a political revolution clearly demarcating separate stages, but
a complex, permanent process of social revolution lasting over
300 years. In this lengthy, continuous process, where old feudal
relations of production were continually being transformed,
different forms of production existed simultaneously within
British feudal society. To Schram (1971), who pursues this
&dquo;blurring of stages&dquo; theme much further than others in the field
are willing,, it may come as a complete surprise that Marx saw
&dquo;sprouts&dquo; of capitalism dating to the late 1400s, and that these
sprouts were fostered not by the actions of the bourgeoisie but by
those of the crown and nobility.
This misconception of stages of history as distinct and
separable is an integral part of the same conception that con-
ceives of superstructure and base in a similar manner. Marx’s 
.
concept of stages in history is not an &dquo;ideal typology&dquo; (Schram
and d’Encausse, 1969: 8), but is, like all his other concepts,
dynamic and changing. Almost from its inception, the British
feudal order underwent continual changes in form, gradually
developing elements that presaged the emergence of capitalism.
This gradual quantitative change in the importance of capitalist
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forms within feudal society made, Marx felt, the final qualitative
change from feudalism to capitalism possible (Harvey, 1973:
202).4 This process consisted of a gradual expropriation of the
rural British population from small, self-supporting farms into
a class who needed to sell their labor-power in order to live. As
part of this process, these small landholdings were concentrated,
by legal and illegal means, into large private capitalist farms
producing food commodities and market goods for the growing
domestic market. This was, as Marx conceptualized it, a self-
feeding process: the expropriated peasants both became a source
of labor on the large farms and sheep ranches and provided a
market for the farm commodities. Others migrated to towns and
fed a gradually emerging proletariat (Marx, 1967a: 723-749).
This dynamic process of change within the &dquo;stage&dquo; of feudalism
concretizes Marx’s conception of old relations of production
being destroyed as they become &dquo;fetters&dquo; upon the development
of productive forces. This does not take place only after a political
&dquo;bourgeois-democratic&dquo; revolution, as the determinist view
would have it, but it happens for hundreds of years before
capitalism becomes even recognizable, gradually and in a &dquo;per-
manently revolutionary&dquo; fashion. This process was carried out
not solely by the bourgeoisie, moreover, but also by the conscious
actions of the crown, Parliament, and landed nobility long before
the modern bourgeoisie had emerged.
The gradual process of &dquo;freeing&dquo; serfs, for example, cul-
minating only at the time of the Stuart restoration, had the effect
of changing what were essentially communal property relations
with mutual obligation between lord and vassal into private
property relations between landlord and tenant (Marx, 1967a:
723-727). Large estates were thereafter owned by landed elites
and were farmed in hundreds of small parcels by tenants. These
tenant farmers were self-supporting, owned their own means of
production (farming tools, spinning wheels, and so forth), and
produced almost every daily necessity for themselves. As the price
of wool grew by leaps and bounds with the development of the
early Flemish textile industry, landlords began to see the financial
advantage of commercial sheep farming. But the old relations of
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production, with thousands of self-supporting tenants farming
this potentially profitable sheep-grazing land, acted as a real
&dquo;fetter&dquo; on the development of commercial sheep-ranching and
the textile industry of which it was an arm. This contradiction
between the forces and relations of production was resolved in the
overthrow of the old relations through a process of &dquo;estate
clearing.&dquo; Whole tenant populations were often forcibly evicted
from their old way of life and into new relations where they owed
no means of production and were forced to sell their labor to
someone else (Marx, 1967a: 728-733). Land formerly populated
and farmed by thousands of families became, instead, populated
by thousands of sheep. In this case, a real social revolution,
continuously turning subsistence farmers into wage laborers,
land into capital, landlords into capitalist farmers, and self-
supporting families into consumers, was underway long before
the &dquo;stage&dquo; of capitalism was even distinguishable. Thus, when
Marx asserts that &dquo;the problem itself arises only when the
material conditions for its solution are already present or at
least in the course of formation&dquo; (Marx, 1971: 21), he in no way
means that a bourgeois-democratic revolution will not come
about until feudalism has &dquo;exhausted&dquo; its forces of production.
On the contrary, Marx means precisely what the above passage
suggests-the &dquo;problem&dquo; of old relations of production (land
tenancy) arises only when the Flemish wool industry (the
material conditions for its solution) is present or in the course
of formation. This necessarily implies that a great deal of devel-
opment of the &dquo;solution&dquo;-capitalist forms of production-must
be present in feudal society before a problem of &dquo;fettering&dquo; can
possibly arise. There could be no clearer example of &dquo;telescoping&dquo;
stages of history and of blurring the distinction between them.
DETERMINISM AND REVOL UTIONAR Y STRA TEG Y
Even if this concept of clearly demarcated stages of history has
no basis in Marx and cannot be used as evidence of voluntarism in
Mao, there is another, more complex problem raised by the issue
of &dquo;speeding&dquo; the stages of history. The difficulty, no doubt, is
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due to the fact that Marx’s theoretical writings were based upon
the development of capitalism in Western Europe. He simply
never clearly sketched out the implications of his analysis of
capitalism for the rest of the world, much less prescribed revolu-
tionary strategies. Yet despite the lack of an overall conception
in Marx of how non-Western European, nonfeudal societies were
to develop, we find Mao condemned as a voluntarist for not
waiting for capitalism to develop a large working class with which
to lead a revolution. Without such a coherent body of Marx’s
writings on non-European situations, how can Mao’s strategy be
so evaluated? The only way, clearly, is to understand Marx’s
method of analysis and evaluate Mao’s use or misuse of it in the
unique conditions of China. Far too frequently, Marx’s writings
on history and revolution are not treated as embodiments of a
method of analysis to be applied to the unique material and
historical conditions of an area, but, strangely, are reduced in
the manner that they have so often been in sectarian left-wing
polemics-into a rigid ecumenical dogma from which only an
infidel deviates. Thus, for those commentators who interpret
Marx as a determinist, Mao has sinned by refusing to wait for
the &dquo;predetermined&dquo; full-scale development of capitalism
(Meisner, 1971: 7) and by arousing and leading the peasantry-
signs for which Mao is excommunicated from the very &dquo;essence&dquo;
of Marxism (Schram and d’Encausse, 1969: 110-112).
This position is predicated upon the belief that Marx’s writings
on Western Europe embody eternal &dquo;objective laws&dquo; for world
social development. Such eternal laws, applicable to all material
and historical situations, were clearly precluded in Marx’s
method, which stressed empirical study of the economic basis of
society, its social relations, its superstructure, and the interrela-
tions between them. No &dquo;eternal laws,&dquo; divorced from concrete
analysis, are possible-this was the core of Marx’s critique of
German idealist philosophers (Marx and Engels, 1970). Yet
interpreters of Mao-thought who, upon a determinist interpreta-
tion of Marx’s method, are convinced that there are such
objective laws, strain to find them. Not surprisingly, they find a
variety of statements by Marx that are contradictory and &dquo;incon-
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clusive&dquo; (Schram and d’Encausse, 1969: 9-15). Marx, referring
to different geographical areas, each with distinctive economies,
social structures, cultures, and histories, said in some places
that peasants could become a revolutionary force, and in others
that they could not; he seemed to say at one point that non-
European countries had to be &dquo;Europeanized&dquo; as part of their
development, but at another. he implied that they could take an
independent course of development; and his &dquo;objective laws&dquo;
seemed to make capitalism a &dquo;predetermined stage,&dquo; yet at other
times he clearly said that capitalism was by no means inevitable
under all conditions. The conclusion, of course, is that Marx was
a somewhat inconsistent thinker, embodying both voluntaristic
and deterministic &dquo;strands.&dquo; Mao is said to have &dquo;accented&dquo; the
&dquo;voluntaristic strands,&dquo; while the &dquo;deterministic strands,&dquo; since
Marx was &dquo;really&dquo; a determinist, are used to evaluate Mao
. 
(Schram and d’Encausse, 1969: 14-19, 110-112).
This interpretation takes Marx’s theoretical treatment of
Western Europe and, upon a determinist reading, mechanically
extrapolates it to the rest of the world. When Marx subsequently
makes statements contradicting his so-called &dquo;determinist&dquo;
formulations for Europe, they are taken only as fragmentary
&dquo;voluntaristic strands&dquo; that have served subsequent revolution-
aries as legitimating devices for their voluntaristic revisions of
Marx. Yet Marx’s seemingly inconsistent pronouncements on
non-European countries are ample testament to the fact that he
saw an infinite variety of historical alternatives facing a non-
European country. When an open, flexible method of analysis
is applied to widely different historical and material situations,
the conclusions are, quite naturally, widely different. It is a
fundamentally fruitless undertaking to search for a single
Marxian position toward the revolutionary potential of the
peasantry, the probability of the development of capitalism in
undeveloped areas, or of the &dquo;timing&dquo; of revolutions.
Marx clearly specified that the capitalist mode of production
was a &dquo;special kind&dquo;-one &dquo;with specific historical features&dquo;
(Marx, 1967b: 878). It presupposes, as does any mode of
production, a given level of social productive forces and a
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specific ‘form&dquo; of their development as a historical precondition.
This precondition is itself the result of a previous, highly specific
historical process (Marx, 1967b: 878). Marx often separated the
terms &dquo;modern society&dquo; from the &dquo;capitalist mode of production,&dquo;
and, although he saw the possibility of a &dquo;higher form of society&dquo;
developing out of capitalism, he studiously avoided the assertion
that capitalism is the only path of development to a &dquo;higher
form&dquo; (Marx, 1967b: 819-820, 883, 885). Indeed, Marx’s &dquo;objec-
tive laws&dquo; are labeled the &dquo;law of development of the capitalist
mode of production&dquo;-not simply the law of historical develop-
ment (Marx, 1967b: 885). More explicitly, Marx replied to the
&dquo;misunderstanding concerning my so-called theory&dquo; that the
&dquo;historical inevitability&dquo; of the process of the development of
capitalism was &dquo;expressly limited to the countries of Western
Europe&dquo; and could by no means be mechanically transferred to
other areas of the world (Marx and Engels, 1955: 319)..
The reason why, as Marx felt, capitalism developed in
Western Europe was the existence of a politically fixed relation
between property and labor-feudalism-which regulated the
distribution of all surplus-product, making accumulation a
possibility (Meszaros, 1972: 140). This distinctive Western
European form of social organization, further, developed in
distinctive, often seemingly accidental, ways. Squabbles between
the crown and feudal lords hastened the dissolution of the &dquo;bands
of feudal retainers,&dquo; transferring a form of communal property
into large, landed private property (Marx, 1967a: 718-719). This
large landed property was a prerequisite to the historical process
of large-scale destruction of small subsistence farming, forcing
the rural population to sell its labor and buy means of subsistence,
while transforming land into capital to be used in the commercial
farming of food commodities or in sheep-ranching (Marx, 1967a:
714-715; 1967b: 821). All of this represents a specific historical
development of a distinctive mode of production into another,
equally distinctive mode.
This process of the expropriation of the small-landholding
and tenant peasantry, which was in England a precondition for
the development of capitalism, was in no way predetermined or
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inevitable even once underway. Marx explicitly noted that a
similar &dquo;freeing&dquo; of Roman slaves from their traditional ties to
land and master transformed them not into a proletariat but
into a &dquo;rabble,&dquo; much like the &dquo;poor whites&dquo; of the southern
United States. An analogous &dquo;freeing&dquo; of serfs in Eastern Europe
likewise failed to lead to capitalist relations of production. In
both of these cases, Marx explained, what was lacking were the
specific forms of property relations that preceded capitalism in
Western Europe (Marx and Engels, 1955: 319-320).
Moreover, once the process of genuine capitalist growth is
begun, it is still in no way predetermined, but is contingent upon
a whole range of historical and geographical factors. The early
development of capitalist production in Northern Italy, for
example, which emancipated and expropriated serfs earlier than
in the rest of Europe, and which saw large-scale migrations to
towns; actually reversed itself at the end of the fifteenth century,
after world markets and trade routes changed dramatically. In
this case the emerging proletariat actually moved back into the
countryside and reverted to earlier forms of small-holding and
tenant-farming (Marx, 1967a: 716).
Just as the development of capitalism, even in parts of Western
Europe, was in no way unilinear or predetermined, neither were
the fates of non-European countries predetermined in Marx’s
writings. In India, where the British were already performing the
often brutal process Marx ironically referred to as &dquo;Europeaniza-
tion,&dquo; Marx saw that the country would probably be drawn
completely into the capitalist system, eventually being united
by new forms of transportation and communication before it
would be able to throw off the yoke of British imperialism
(Schram and d’Encausse, 1969: 115-119). For capitalism to
develop in India, traditional Indian society had to be radically
transformed. During Marx’s lifetime the British were carrying
out this transformation, &dquo;speeding&dquo; and &dquo;telescoping&dquo; into the
space of several decades the process of transformation that had
taken over 300 years in Britain. As a prerequisite to this &dquo;Euro-
peanization,&dquo; traditional small-village &dquo;relations of production&dquo;
were transformed as the British, by manipulating markets and
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setting up unfavorable trade regulations, were able to destroy
the indigenous Indian textile industry, transforming a self-
sufficient textile-producing society into a cotton-growing
population and a dependent, textile-consuming market (Schram
and d’Encausse, 1969: 116-119). In analyzing this historical
process, Marx in no way implied that it was inevitable, nor did
he imply, as Schram seems to suggest (Schram and d’Encausse,
1969: 9), that this was a desirable or &dquo;unfortunately necessary&dquo;
process.
Indeed, under certain historical and material social conditions,
the &dquo;inevitable&dquo; stage of capitalism can be dispensed with
altogether. Marx’s studies of Russian society convinced him that
a revolution was imminent there (Marx and Engels, 1955: 103,
241, 289). Further, his understanding of land tenancy and social
conditions in rural Russia led him to the belief that under Russia’s
specific, &dquo;communal&dquo; form of rural relations of production, the
mass of the agricultural population were &dquo;non-proletarian&dquo;
members of a &dquo;working-class&dquo; that was far more impoverished
than actual proletarians (Marx and Engels, 1955: 220, 289, 319-
320). This created a historical condition where, after a political
revolution of a specific character, Russia could embark upon a
unique course of industrial and social development. Moreover,
this course of development entailed some sort of conscious choice
on the part of power-holders in Russia’s political superstructure.
Western-influenced modernizers, for example, had recently been
trying to transform Russia along Western lines:
If Russia wants to become a capitalist nation after the example
of the West-European countries-and during the last few years she
has been taking a lot of trouble in this direction-she will not
succeed without having first transformed a good part of her
peasants into proletarians; and then, once drawn into the whirl-
pool of the capitalist economy, she will have to endure its
inexorable laws like other profane nations. [Marx and Engels,
1955: 293]
But if the imminent Russian revolution does not assume a
specific character, and if instead of pursuing an independent path
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of development Russia &dquo;continues to pursue the path she has
followed since 1861,&dquo; then &dquo;she will lose the finest chance ever
offered by history to a people and undergo all the fatal vicissi-
tudes of the capitalist regime&dquo; (Marx and Engels,1955: 292). This
opportunity was afforded by the existence of communal rather
than private property relations in Russian village communities.
The destruction of this communal property-a destruction so
necessary for the development of capitalism-would have to be
halted before Russia could pursue an independent path of devel-
opment based upon these communal forms of rural property
relations:
Thus the analysis in Capital does not provide any arguments for
or against the viability of the village community, but the special
research into this subject which I conducted, and for which I
obtained material from original sources, has convinced me that
this community is the fulcrum of Russia’s social revival, but in
order that it might function in this way one would first have to
eliminate the destructive influences which assail it from every
quarter and then ensure the conditions normal for spontaneous
development. [Marx and Engels, 1955: 320]
These passages cannot be dismissed as mere &dquo;voluntaristic
strands&dquo; within a body of largely determinist writings which have
served only to legitimate &dquo;extreme voluntarism&dquo; on the part of
others. They are, in fact, the logical outcome of Marx’s method,
which was not to develop &dquo;ideal types&dquo; or &dquo;stages&dquo; applicable to
all of history and to all societies, but to examine the specific
material and historical conditions of a specific area before coming
to conclusions applicable only where those conditions hold.
Thus, Marx, in a reply to a critic who attributed to him such an
a priori conception of stages of world history, explained:
The chapter on primitive accumulation does not claim to do more
than trace the path by which, in Western Europe, the capitalist
economic system emerged from the womb of the feudal economic
system.
That is all. But this is too little for my critic. He insists on trans-
forming my historical sketch of the genesis of capitalism in
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Western Europe into an historico-philosophic theory of the
general path of development prescribed by fate to all nations,
whatever the historical circumstances in which they find them-
selves, in order that they may ultimately arrive at the economic
system which ensures, together with the greatest expansion of the
productive powers of social labour, the most complete develop-
ment of man. But I beg his pardon. [Marx and Engels, 1955:
293-294]
This misconception of Marx as having set forth a theory of
stages of world development is ultimately based upon the
common determinist interpretation that conceives of the process
of production &dquo;causing&dquo; all other aspects of society, which are
all drawn along in its inexorable, &dquo;predetermined&dquo; movement.
But, far from being a theory of stages from which only a volun-
tarist would deviate, Marx’s method of analysis is flexible and
contingent upon the unique material conditions of a given
society. This flexible method requires’ only that historically
developed material and economic conditions be conceived in
their dense, structural interrelations with all aspects of the
superstructure.
Thus events strikingly analogous but taking place in different
historical surroundings led to totally different results. By studying
each of these forms of evolution separately and then comparing
them one can easily find the clue to this phenomenon, but one will
never arrive there by using as one’s master key a general historico-
philosophical theory, the supreme virtue of which consists in being
supra-historical. [Marx and Engels, 1955: 294]
Such a &dquo;suprahistorical&dquo; conception of stages of history can in
no way be used to measure Mao’s voluntaristic deviation from
Marx, since no such theory exists in Marx’s own writings.
Instead, the key to understanding Mao’s relationship to Marx is
to examine how Mao employs this often-misconceived Marxian
method of analysis. Mao’s understanding of the relationship
between superstructure and base, and his usages of terms and
definitions, will indicate far more about Mao’s position in
relation to Marx than his supposed deviation from Marx’s
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&dquo;determinism&dquo; and its spurious counterpart-the conception of
. 
a rigidly defined, predetermined progression of stages of history.
MAO’S &dquo;YOLUNTARISM&dquo; .
Even if we accept this argument that Marx was not an
&dquo;economic determinist,&dquo; and even if there is no fixed conception
of a progression of rigidly defined world-historical stages in
Marx’s writings against which to measure Mao’s &dquo;deviation,&dquo; is it
not still true that Mao is a voluntarist in the sense that he feels
direct &dquo;moral transformation&dquo; to be the force generating social
’ 
change? No matter how one interprets Marx, if Mao feels simply
that &dquo;the making of a new revolutionary soul&dquo; is the key to
eliciting social change, then he is indeed a thorough-going volun-
tarist. But Mao’s reliance upon &dquo;the human factor&dquo; has in fact
been exaggerated in the prevailing literature on Mao, just as
Marx’s reliance on the economic factor has been. Mao, we are
told, has neglected the vital link in Marx between the super-
structure and the material life of human beings-the &dquo;economic
base&dquo; including the centrally important relations of production.
He is taken to assert that changes in people’s attitudes can
become an independent, all-powerful source of social change. &dquo;In
modern China, socialist man did not determine his social self by
his own labor; he was fashioned by internalizing noneconomic
ideas imposed upon him by a personalistic state&dquo; (Wakeman,
1973: 28). The state must directly shape the consciousness of
human beings because in &dquo;the Maoist view&dquo; the transformation
of society &dquo;depends entirely on the consciousness, the wills and
the activities of men&dquo; (Meisner, 1971: 31). Indeed, such a view
purportedly reveals that Mao is one of the &dquo;heirs of Marx&dquo; who
imagines &dquo;that the methods of analysis of the founder of scientific
socialism fail to apply to a whole historical epoch&dquo; (Schram and
d’Encausse, 1969: 112).
Mao then, according to this view, has moved away from the
Marxian idea that human consciousness is created in the material
work process-in concrete relations of production-and now
asserts that social change will follow from the direct socializa-
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tion of people by a moralistic state. Forsaking the &dquo;economic
and technical transformation&dquo; that was an integral part of Marx’s
theory, Mao has supposedly come increasingly to believe that
social change &dquo;would come with moral transformation, the
making of a new revolutionary soul&dquo; (Goldman, 1973: 246). This
is a voluntarism of the crudest sort. Mao now appears to be
closer to the idealist Hegel than to the materialist Marx.
This misinterpretation of Mao is made possible by a corre-
sponding misconception of Marx’s method-the idea that super-
structure and base are distinct, separable entities. But Mao does
not, any more than did Marx, see these aspects of society in such
a manner. On the contrary, Mao sees the two as interpenetrating.
Mao’s &dquo;Reading Notes on the Soviet Union’s Political Economy&dquo;
reveal that Mao in fact sees that certain superstructural changes
entail basic changes in the relations of production-themselves
an integral part of the economic base. In many cases Mao clearly
pushes superstructural change for the very reason that it will
necessarily effect a change in relations of production. A reduction
in wage differentials, intended to restrict &dquo;bourgeois right&dquo; in the
superstructure, for example, changes the social relations of
production in basic ways, altering distribution patterns and
lessening material and social status stratification. In terms of
voluntarism, this is of vital importance, for it reveals that Mao
has not forsaken the material conditions out of which the super-
structure arises in Marxism. Marx saw these relations of pro-
duction-human material life-as needing transformation before
human consciousness and the other aspects of the superstructure
could undergo lasting change. Mao’s method has consistently
been to stress both direct superstructural change and changes in
these &dquo;relations of production.&dquo; This is far from a voluntarism
that conceives of social change as flowing primarily from atti-
tudinal socialization, &dquo;internalization of non-economic ideas,&dquo; or
&dquo;the making of a new revolutionary soul.&dquo;
Mao’s earliest theoretical writings reflect his conscious
avoidance of &dquo;determinist&dquo; interpretations of Marx. Mao clearly
conceives of &dquo;economic base&dquo; and &dquo;superstructure&dquo; not as
separate factors between which a causal relation exists, but as
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aspects &dquo;internal&dquo; to society, densely and dialectically inter-
related. It is this appreciation, not the voluntarist’s exclusive
reliance upon superstructure and &dquo;will,&dquo; that leads Mao to assert
that theory and superstructure can play, at times, decisive roles.
In &dquo;On Contradiction,&dquo; Mao begins by outlining Marx’s
materialist conception of history:
Changes in society are due chiefly to the development of the
internal contradictions in society, that is, the contradiction
between the productive forces and the relations of production, the
contradiction between the old and the new; it is the development
of these contradictions that pushes society forward and gives the
impetus for the supersession of the old society by the new. [Mao,
1966: 27-28]
Mao clearly does not see this materialist conception as denying
the importance of noneconomic factors in producing social
change. The &dquo;relations of production,&dquo; &dquo;theory,&dquo; and &dquo;super-
structure,&dquo; as is proper in any dialectical conception, all play
important roles. Mao feels this to be rooted firmly in Marx’s
dialectical, materialist method of analysis. However, &dquo;some
people&dquo; do not recognize this:
Some people think that this is not true of certain contradictions.
For instance, in the contradiction between productive forces and
the relations of production, the productive forces are the principal
aspect; in the contradiction between theory and practice, practice
is the principal aspect; in the contradiction between the economic
base and the superstructure, the economic base is the principal
aspect; and there is no change in their respective positions. This
is a mechanical materialist conception, not the dialectical materi-
alist conception. [Mao, 1966: 58]
People who attribute primary importance exclusively to the
forces of production and economic base, Mao feels, have fallen
into &dquo;mechanical materialism&dquo;-a form of economic deter-
minism. Mao explains that this interpretation neglects the
dialectical component in Marx’s thought. Materialism, for Mao,
is by no means inconsistent with mutual interrelation:
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True, the productive forces, practice and the economic base
generally play the principal and decisive role; whoever denies
this is not a materialist. But it must also be admitted that in certain
’ 
conditions, such aspects as the relations of production, theory and
the superstructure in turn manifest themselves in the principal and
decisive roles. When it is impossible for the productive forces to
develop- without a change in the relations of production, then
change in the relations of production plays the principal and
decisive role.... When a task, no matter which, has to be per-
. formed, but there is as yet no guiding line, method, plan or policy,
the principal and decisive thing is to decide on a guiding line,
method, plan or policy. When the superstructure (politics,
culture, etc.) obstructs the development of the economic base,
political and cultural changes become principal and decisive. Are .
we going against materialism when we say this? No. The reason is
. 
that while we recognize that in the general development of history
the material determines the mental and the social being determines
social consciousness, we also-and indeed must-recognize the
reaction of mental on material things; of social consciousness on
social being and of the superstructure on the economic base. This
does not go against materialism; on the contrary, it avoids
mechanical materialism and firmly upholds dialectical materi-
alism. [Mao, 1966: 58-59]
Here Mao, far from inverting Marx’s dialectic, is simply assert-
ing, as did Engels before him, the dialectical aspects of Marx’s
method over the common mechanical, &dquo;determinist&dquo; misconcep-
tion that apparently existed in the China of the 1930s as well as in
the Europe of the 1890s and in the modern-day China field. There
is nothing in this passage, given Marx’s dialectical conception
and use of terms, to indicate a deviation from Marx in the direc-
tion of voluntarism.
MAO AND MARX ON HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS .
AND RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION
Mao’s assertions in &dquo;On Contradiction&dquo; that the mental and
superstructural can at times react decisively upon the material
and the economic in no way preclude a systematic conception of
direct links between material and mental life. In Marx, this link
is the concept of &dquo;practical human activity&dquo;-the direct and
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constant human interaction with nature in the work process
where human beings produce their means of subsistence, as well
as an understanding of the world and of social relations with
other human beings (Meszaros, 1972: 93-113; Ollman, 1971:131-
157). Different relations of production-entailing different forms
of division of labor and different patterns of human interaction in
the work process-necessarily produce human beings with
different understandings of their social relations with each
other. These understandings are reflected in human actions which
manifest an apparent &dquo;human nature&dquo; (Ollman, 1971: 75-130).
Any Marxian strategy to transform human beings must of
necessity transform these relations of production, which pro-
foundly shape the work process in which humans develop a
consciousness of the world.
Those relations of production distinctive to capitalism com-
prise, for Marx, a work process that shapes human beings in
distinctive ways. In capitalist production Marx saw that people
were &dquo;alienated&dquo; from their own work process-the worker plays
no part in deciding what to produce or how to produce it. This
is a break between the individual and what Marx termed the
&dquo;most important life-activity&dquo;-self-conscious, purposeful
labor. People subsequently come to see this entire portion of
their lives as a commodity to be exchanged for wages, and often
find little interest or fulfillment in dull, repetitive work tasks.
Second, people in capitalist society, Marx felt, are separated from
the products of their own labor-workers have little control over
or contact with the objects of labor after they have been pro-
duced. This is a &dquo;break between the individual and the material
world.&dquo; Workers, because of this, are no longer able to see their
many interdependencies with &dquo;nature&dquo; and with society as a
whole. Third, a worker engaged in an autonomous, repetitive
work task, with very little interaction or communication with
other workers during the labor process, is unable to see the
manifold social connections between individuals in human
society, and this results in the individual conceiving of the self
as an autonomous being, owing nothing to society for attained
positions or abilities. And finally, the competition and class
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hostility characteristic of capitalism place real barriers between
human beings. As a result, people come to see themselves as they
actually are under capitalism-as isolated individuals with a
basically competitive stance toward one another (Marx, 1964:
106-119, 128-164; Meszaros, 1972: 14-15, 130-150; Ollman,
1971: 137-153, 205-228). Since the specific form of capitalist
relations of production are, in Marx, the material source of these
competitive and individualistic outlooks, the relations of
production themselves must be transformed before any lasting
changes in human consciousness can be effected. A voluntarist
is one who ignores these relations of production and who
proceeds to transform human beings through moral exhortation
and ritualistic participation, heedless of the material sources
of consciousness.
Mao, in his earliest theoretical writings, has traced out these
direct links between practical human activity and consciousness.
In &dquo;On Practice,&dquo; where these links between the material and the
mental are his central theme, Mao declares that the material basis
of human knowledge and consciousness is his notion of &dquo;practice&dquo;
-the ongoing human interaction with and activity in the real
world of &dquo;production&dquo; and &dquo;class struggle&dquo; (Mao, 1966: 1). For
Mao as well as for Marx, &dquo;Man’s knowledge depends mainly on
his activity in material production, through which he comes
gradually to understand the phenomena, the properties and the
laws of nature, and the relations between himself and nature; and
through this activity he also gradually comes to understand, in
varying degrees, certain relations that exist between man and
man&dquo; (Mao, 1966: 1-2). But the development of human con-
sciousness does not take place solely in the workplace, because
&dquo;Man’s social practice is not confined to activity in production,
but takes many other forms-class struggle, political life,
scientific and artistic pursuits; in short, as a social being,
man participates in all spheres of the practical life of society&dquo;
(Mao, 1966: 2). So Mao includes in his concept of practice not
only the work process but also both political and cultural life-
&dquo;both of which are intimately bound up with material life&dquo;
(Mao, 1966: 2).
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The implication of this concept of practice for people living
in a changing socialist society is that they must actively involve
themselves in transforming the political and cultural life of
society, as well as economic life, in order to transform their
consciousness to the point where they are able to &dquo;grasp the
essence, the totality and the internal relations of things&dquo; (Mao,
1966: 5). To transform your consciousness, &dquo;to know a certain
class of things directly, you must personally participate in the
practical struggle to change reality, to change that thing or class
of things, for only thus can you come into contact with them as
phenomena; only through personal participation in practical
struggle to change reality can you uncover the essence of that
thing or class of things and comprehend them&dquo; (Mao, 1966: 7-8).
Those who do not actively involve themselves in the material
activity of social change will remain entrenched in their earlier
forms of consciousness-their &dquo;thinking lags behind reality; this
is because man’s cognition is limited by numerous social condi-
tions&dquo; (Mao, 1966: 17). The centrality of this link between the
material and the mental is reflected in the concept of education
in China, which stresses both the role of the teacher in instilling
new ideas into the pupil and the role of practice, or taking part
in both production tasks and political &dquo;struggles&dquo; (Munro, 1971:
631-634). Indeed, one of the major educational reforms pushed
during the Cultural Revolution was the linking of schools and
. factories:
Further, this Maoist notion of &dquo;practice&dquo; just as is its
counterpart, Marx’s concept of &dquo;practical human activity&dquo;-is
directly linked with the central Marxian category, the &dquo;relations
of production.&dquo; For Mao as well as for Marx, these relations of
production, an integral part of a society’s economic base, pro-
foundly shape the human activity out of which consciousness is
formed. Far from being a voluntarist, Mao feels that these
relations of production must be transformed before a lasting
change in human consciousness can be achieved. One of the
factors holding back desired social change, Mao explains in
&dquo;Dialectical Materialism,&dquo; is &dquo;idealist philosophy,&dquo; or the
&dquo;reactionary ideology of the ruling classes.&dquo; This ideology, Mao
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explains, is firmly rooted in the material process of production
with its technical and social division of labor.
with the development of production, the separation between
manual labor and intellectual labor was responsible for ranking
idealism first among currents of philosophical thought. With the
development of the productive forces of society, the division of
labor saw the emergence of persons elevating themselves entirely
and exclusively to intellectual labor.... Intellectual labor then
becomes the exclusive privilege of the ruling class, while manual
labor becomes the fate of the oppressed classes. [Schram, 1969:
182]
The necessary elimination of this ideological aspect of the super-
structure, therefore, cannot be accomplished by mere exhorta-
tion. Rather, a necessary precondition for superstructural change
is a change in the division of labor-a crucial factor historically
and at present in the &dquo;relations of production.&dquo; Thus, &dquo;To
eliminate the distinction between manual labor and intellectual
labor is one of the preconditions for eliminating idealist
philosophy&dquo; (Schram, 1969: 182). Here Mao is asserting that a
necessary precondition for superstructural change is a change in
the division of labor-a central aspect of the relations of
production.
/!EZ~4 TVOAT~ OF P~ODC/C77CWRELATI NS PRODU TION
AND CHINA’S MASS CAMPAIGNS
A voluntarist would ignore these direct links between human
consciousness and the relations of production, and assert that
attitudinal change can come about solely in mass movements or
campaigns that tend to heighten the individual’s socialist
consciousness. Maoists certainly employ mass campaigns, but
they have not ignored the links between consciousness and
material life. A central, but often misunderstood, part of China’s
major campaigns has been a consistent effort to transform
China’s work process-particularly to minimize status differ-
ences between mental and manual labor, to encourage some sort
of worker involvement in the decision-making process, and to
reduce income differentials. Most often referred to in the Chinese
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press as changes in &dquo;those portions of the superstructure not in
line with a socialist economic base&dquo;-which, in part, they are-
these changes also entail, as Maoists recognize, a basic trans-
formation of the relations of production-which for Marx was an
integral part of the economic base.
Most of the literature in the China field, however, fails to
recognize this. Wakeman, for example, sees the Cultural
Revolution as an act of will limited to superstructural change:
&dquo;The Cultural Revolution was an ideological paradox: a class war
within the superstructure of public opinion&dquo; (Wakeman, 1973:
306). In fact, social change during the Cultural Revolution was
not limited to the superstructure, but aimed for real changes in
what are properly termed the relations of production. Each of
those aspects of capitalist relations of production that Marx saw
as generating an &dquo;alienated,&dquo; individualistic, and competitive
outlook were attacked during the Great Leap Forward and
Cultural Revolution experiments, as the attitudes themselves
were directly attacked as well. Instead of the worker playing no
part in deciding what to produce or how to produce it, models
during both the Great Leap and the Cultural Revolution pre-
scribed the active involvement of workers in basic-level discus-
sion groups, whose role was to criticize and suggest improve-
ments in the product and in the methods of producing it (Bastid,
1974: 184-188). Instead of the worker having no control over or
contact with the product after it is produced, the Maoist model
has stressed a similar process of participation in making contracts
for delivery of the product. In the course of discussions, the
worker learns where the product is going and to what social use
it will be put (Bettelheim, 1974: 69-90; Schurmann, 1968: 293-
307). Finally, the separation between human beings arising out of
competition is to be alleviated by reducing individual competition
over material rewards. According to the Dazhai and Daqing
models, individual material rewards will be linked with &dquo;ideo-
logicar or attitudinal criteria, while bonuses and raises will be,
whenever possible, tied to group rather than to individual
performance. Coupled with this is a constant stress on the social
and political significance of work (Hoffman, 1974; Andors,
1969, 1974).
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Although this model for factory management is not yet
described in China as a program to eliminate human alienation,5
and although it does not attempt immediately to eliminate the
fragmented jobs associated with production-line activity, it
nonetheless entails significant changes in relations of production.
Power relationships, status differentials, distribution, and even
certain aspects of the division of labor have been the objects
of change.
The theoretical significance of these changes is easy to miss, for
an ostensible campaign to produce superstructural change in
China often only implies these changes in relations of production.
References to relations of production, while usually present, are
most often relegated to the more theoretical articles accompany-
ing a campaign. A prime example of the difficulties in analyzing
what, on the surface, are merely superstructural, changes is the
recent &dquo;dictatorship of the proletariat&dquo; campaign. Ostensibly an
ideological campaign, it would seem to be aimed solely at super-
structural change, but attacks on &dquo;bourgeois right&dquo; show that
Maoists intend this campaign to further transform China’s
relations of production.
&dquo;Bourgeois right&dquo;-part of which includes the principle of
pay according to work-we are told, continues to exist in China
in the form of the eight-grade wage scale. As a system of rules
governing wage policy, this aspect of &dquo;bourgeois right&dquo; is part
of the superstructure, and &dquo;all this differs very little from the old
society&dquo; (Zhang, 1975: 6). So the campaign against bourgeois
right appears to be aimed at transforming elements of the super-
structure left over from the old society. This it certainly is, but it
is far more. As we saw in Marx’s treatment of superstructure and
base, these aspects are not entirely separable. The Maoist treat-
ment of social factors appears to reflect a recognition of this
fact. Bourgeois right, when viewed from one perspective, is a
system of rules within the superstructure. But bourgeois right, as
a system of laws that reinforces a system of ownership and
distribution, belongs also to the economic base and has important
consequences there. Indeed, without a superstructure of rules to
regulate economic activity, the concept of &dquo;economic base&dquo; would
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be meaningless. Maoists feel that the very existence of this strati-
fied system of distribution &dquo;makes up the important economic
base giving rise to new bourgeois elements&dquo; (Zhe, 1975: 15). For
Yao Wen-yuan, the primary significance of this ideological
campaign is contained wholly within the central concept of
relations of production:
we must consolidate and develop socialist ownership by the whole
people and socialist collective ownership by working people,
prevent the restoration of bourgeois right already liquidated with
regard to the system of ownership and continue to fulfill, gradually
and over a fairly long period of time, that part of the task which is
yet to be fulfilled in the transformation of ownership; and with
regard to the two other aspects of the relations of production,
namely, the mutual relations between men and the relations of
distribution, we must restrict bourgeois right, criticize the idea
of bourgeois right and continually weaken the basis that engenders
capitalism. So we must persevere in the revolution in the realm of
the superstructure. [Yao, 1975: 8; emphasis added]
For Yao, the only significance of this superstructural change is
that it entails basic changes in relations of production. In this
sense, superstructural changes and changes in the economic base
are inseparable.
MAO’S CONCEPTION OF RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION
Yao’s conception of the theoretical significance of the relations
of production is patterned closely after Mao’s own. What has
been only implicit in Mao’s previous treatments of relations of
production-specifically in his concept of &dquo;practice&dquo;-has only
recently been spelled out for the West in Mao Ze-dong sixiang
wansui (Joint Publication Research Service [JPRS], 1974). In
Mao’s &dquo;Reading Notes on the Soviet Union’s Political
Economy,&dquo; his strategy for permanent revolutionary social
change clearly does not stress the superstructure at the expense
of other aspects of society, but aims simultaneously to transform
superstructure and base during the industrialization process.
Mao’s relative emphasis on transforming the superstructure is not
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predicated upon the belief that this alone generates social
change-it stems from his idea that the old superstructure is a
barrier to further change:
In the course of the revolution, only after the backward super-
structure was overthrown was it possible to put an end to the old
relations of production. The old relations of production were
wiped out and new relations of production set up. This paved the
way for the development of new social productive forces. Conse-
quently, we were able to organize a technical revolution vigorously
so as to develop social productive forces on a large scale. Simul-
taneously with the development of productive forces, we must
continue to carry out the transformation of relations of produc-
tion and ideological remolding. [JPRS, 1974: 259] ,
During this period of transition, Mao feels it is necessary to
transform all social relations. This includes both the relations of
production and the different political and cultural elements of the
superstructure (JPRS, 1974: 248). Mao conceives of the relations
of production as consisting of three &dquo;sectors&dquo;-&dquo;ownership of the
means of production, relationships between individuals in the
midst of work, and the distribution system&dquo;-to each of which
closely corresponds certain aspects of the superstructure (JPRS,
1974: 270). The system of ownership of the means of production
has already been substantially transformed, but for Mao there is
a limit to the changes that can be made in this sector within a
given period (JPRS, 1974: 302). In regard to the &dquo;relationships
between individuals in the midst of production,&dquo; which entail the
social division of labor and management practices, and &dquo;distribu-
tion relations,&dquo; which entail wage policy, &dquo;there is the need for
steady improvement all the more&dquo; (JPRS, 1974: 270). In order
to transform the division of labor aspect of the relations of
production (the relationships between individuals), Mao
explains, &dquo;we have adopted such measures as the combining of.
centralized leadership with mass movements, leadership by the
Party, the integration of workers and technicians, participation
of cadres in manual labor, participation of workers in manage-
ment, and continuous change of unreasonable codes and conven-
tions&dquo; (JPRS, 1974: 302). In order to transform the &dquo;distribution&dquo;
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sector of the relations of production, continual changes in work
incentive policies and campaigns against &dquo;bourgeois right&dquo; have
been carried out.
For Mao, &dquo;relations of production&dquo; is clearly a central concept
in his strategy for social change. It subsumes under its heading
aspects of both &dquo;productive forces&dquo; and &dquo;superstructure,&dquo; while
remaining, as for Marx, within the &dquo;economic base,&dquo;
to make a study of production relations, clearly we have to link
it with the study of productive forces on the one hand, and on the
other hand link it with the study of the positive and negative roles
the superstructure plays on production relations. [JPRS, 1974:
280]6 _
Too much of a reliance on the superstructure, Mao argues,
reduces Marx’s conception to a form of voluntarism: to either &dquo;a
theory of the state or the theory of the class struggle&dquo; (JPRS,
1974: 280). Far from being a strategy stressing the superstructure
as the &dquo;leading factor,&dquo; Mao sees social change as proceeding
simultaneously in both superstructure and base, with the rela-
tions of production as the central link. Superstructural and
attitudinal changes which, given Mao’s concept of &dquo;practice,&dquo;
necessarily entail changes in the relations of production, are only
part of an overall conception of social change that seeks to
strike a delicate balance between changes in superstructure
and base: .
We should make the balance and imbalance between productive
forces and production relations, and the balance and imbalance
between production relations and the superstructure, serve as the
key to the study of the economic problems of socialism. [JPRS,
1974: 280]
CONCL USIONS
This Maoist strategy is in no way indicative of a voluntarism
that seeks to induce social change solely, or even primarily, by
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transforming human consciousness and other aspects of the
superstructure. Mao’s continuous, unique message has been that
the economic basis of human society-of which the relations of
production are a central part for Mao as well as for Marx-must
be transformed simultaneously with ideology, laws, and insti-
tutions. Mao has consistently asserted that ideological and
superstructural change cannot be sustained without an under-
lying change in the relations of production-and, simultaneously,
that changes in the relations of production cannot be sustained
without attitudinal and superstructural change. For Mao, there
exists a reciprocal relationship between the two, indicating a
Marxian conception of society as a densely interrelated,
&dquo;organic&dquo; structure, with social factors scarcely separable.
Past interpretations of Mao as a voluntarist have been predi-
cated upon a basic misreading of Marx as a determinist, and upon
the conception of rigid, a priori stages of history that flows
from this fundamental misconception of Marx’s method of
analysis. Without a clear conception of Marx’s method of
analysis and usage of terms and definitions, future efforts to
gauge Mao within the Marxist tradition can serve only to
reproduce the prevailing stereotypes of Mao as a voluntarist and
Marx as a determinist. This essay, an initial effort to explore the
basic implications of Marx’s method for interpreting Mao, can
serve only as a point of departure for the development of a
complex, rather than a caricatured appreciation of the positions
of Marx and Mao within the Marxist tradition. 
z
NOTES
1 . This section on Marx’s usage of concepts and definitions draws heavily from
Ollman’s (1968, 1971, 1973) highly illuminating interpretation of Marx’s thought.
2. Ollman (1971: 17) cites Engels’ Dialectics of Nature, where Engels wrote that
"What Hegel calls reciprocal action is the organic body." To explain changes in the
physical world by referring to the reciprocal action of its parts, Engels asserts, is the same
thing as presenting the world as an organic body.
3. It is noteworthy that Meisner (1965: 166) explicitly rejects the concept of stages
of history as fixed and distinct in Marx, even though some of his other positions on Mao’s
voluntarism are necessarily connected with such a view.
[159]
4. Schram (1971: 230-231) recites this original Marxian formulation&mdash;that quanti-
tative change within stages will lead to a qualitative change between stages&mdash;as evidence
of Mao’s voluntaristic, anti-Marxist blurring of distinct, rigid stages.
5. The fact that Marx’s concept of "alienation" has not been evoked may be due to the
fact that the concept has been associated with revisionism in the communist movement
since it became popular in Eastern Europe during the 1950s as a justification for anti-
Soviet liberalization policies (Zhou, 1963). Munro (1974) has written a brief research note
on this concept and its use in China.
6. I have throughout changed the "production relationship" of the awkward JPRS
translation into the more appropriate "production relations."
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